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ABSTRACT	  This	   article	   examines	   how	   decision-­‐making	   dynamics	   in	   coalition	   cabinets	  influence	   states’	   responses	   to	   international	   norms	   and	   foreign	   policy	   change.	  International	  normative	  structures	  may	  be	   interpreted	  differently	  by	  coalition	  partners,	  which	  share	  the	  authority	  for	  responding	  to	  external	  expectations	  and	  pressures.	   I	   examine	   two	   cases	   of	   internal	   contestation	   over	   international	  norms	  –	  Japanese	  decision-­‐making	  over	  the	  ban	  of	  imported	  rice	  in	  response	  to	  international	  norms	  of	  trade	  liberalisation	  (1993)	  and	  Turkish	  decision-­‐making	  over	  the	  ban	  of	  the	  death	  penalty	  in	  response	  to	  international	  norms	  on	  human	  rights	   (1999-­‐2002).	   	   In	   both	   cases,	   coalition	   partners	   disagreed	   over	   policy	  responses	   to	   the	   norm	   and	   I	   unpack	   the	   way	   in	   which	   the	   norm	   became	  entangled	   in	   internal	   coalition	   politics.	   	   The	   cases	   are	   examples	   of	   (eventual)	  policy	   change,	   which	   challenges	   a	   dominant	   image	   of	   coalitions	   completely	  deadlocked	   actors.	   	   The	   explanations	   of	   these	   case	   outcomes	   furthers	   our	  understanding	  of	  how	  domestic	  agents	  and	  structures	  respond	  to	  international	  norms	  and	  produce	  changes	  in	  foreign	  policies.	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Introduction	  Compliance	   and	   internalisation	   of	   international	   norms	   does	   not	   occur	  evenly	   across	   states.	   	   There	   is	   wide	   variation	   in	   countries’	   response	   to	  international	   norms	   and	   associated	   normative	   and	   material	   pressures.	   	   This	  variation	   may	   be	   due	   to	   a	   clash	   of	   international	   expectations	   with	   states’	  material	   interests	  or	  with	  deeply	  held	  and	   institutionalised	  domestic	  values.	   It	  may	   also	   stem	   from	   clashing	   positions	   of	   different	   agents	   inside	   states	   and	  domestic	  contestation	  over	  responses	  to	  external	  norms.	  	  	  This	   article	   addresses	   calls	   to	   examine	   domestic-­‐level	  mechanisms	   and	  processes	  to	  explain	  variation	  in	  countries’	  compliance	  with	  or	  internalisation	  of	  international	  norms	  (e.g.,	  Checkel,	  2005;	  Cortell	  and	  Davis,	  2005;	  Wiener,	  2007).	  	  The	  focus	  here	  is	  on	  coalition	  cabinets	  in	  parliamentary	  democracies.	  	  A	  coalition	  of	  multiple	  political	  parties	  has	  become	  the	  most	  dominant	  form	  of	  government	  globally	   (Müller	   et	   al,	   2008).	   The	   cabinet’s	   collective	   authority	   for	   making	  foreing	  policy	  is	  complicated	  when	  shared	  by	  two	  or	  more	  parties.	  The	  coalition	  partners	   –	   parties	   who	   are	   independent	   political	   actors,	   competing	   with	   one	  another	   in	  the	  electoral	  process	   -­‐-­‐	  share	  the	  cabinet,	  dividing	  up	  the	  ministries	  and	   the	   responsibility	   for	   making	   decisions	   for	   the	   country.	   This	   can	   be	  particularly	   important	   for	   foreign	   policy,	   as	   key	   cabinet	   posts	   for	   foreign,	  defense,	  or	  trade	  policies	  are	  often	  split	  across	  party	  lines	  (Author,	  2012).	  	  When	  these	   types	   of	   governments	   react	   to	   pull	   processes	   of	   the	   polities	   and	   politics	  associated	   with	   international	   norms,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   understand	   the	  characteristics	  of	  multiparty	  cabinets	  and	  the	  coalition	  politics	  that	  may	  arise,	  in	  order	   to	   explain	   how	   countries	   may	   change	   foreign	   policies	   to	   align	   (either	  through	  internalisation	  or	  compliance)	  with	  external	  expectations.	  	  Although	   coalition	   partners	   do	   not	   always	   disagree	   on	   foreign	   policies,	  they	   frequently	   do,	   and	   such	   disagreements	   can	   affect	   policy-­‐making,	   policy	  choices,	   and	   international	   politics.	   Disagreements	   among	   political	   parties	  may	  be	   especially	   likely	   with	   regard	   to	   international	   norms.	   	   As	   Rathbun	   argues,	  political	  parties,	  as	   ideationally-­‐based	  actors,	   “become	  the	  domestic	  vehicles	  of	  international	  norms”	  (2004,	  p.7).	  	  Occupying	  different	  points	  in	  ideational	  space,	  political	   parties	   may	   have	   different	   orientations	   toward	   external	   normative	  pressures.	  	  How	  party	  competition	  and	  policy	  disagreements	  are	  resolved	  can	  be	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critical	   to	  countries’	   foreign	  policy	  choices,	   including	  choices	   for	  change.	  While	  disagreements	  within	  an	  executive	  are	  certainly	  not	  unique	  to	  coalition	  cabinets,	  the	   dynamics	   of	   bargaining	   and	   decision	   making	   differ	   since	   the	   continued	  existence	   of	   the	   executive	   is	   at	   stake.	   If	   the	   policy	   dispute	   is	   not	   settled,	   the	  coalition	  may	  dissolve.	  	  	  Other	   factors—such	   as	   the	   nature	   of	   security	   threats,	   economic	  interdependence,	  and	  public	  opinion—may	  also	  be	   important	   in	  explaining	  the	  foreign	   policies	   of	   countries	   governed	   by	   coalition	   cabinets.	   The	   full	   range	   of	  external	  and	   internal	  sources	  of	   foreign	  policy	   is	  potentially	  operative	   in	  every	  case.	   Consistent	   with	   the	   decision-­‐making	   approach	   to	   foreign	   policy	   and	  international	   politics	   (Author,	   2015),	   I	   argue	   that	   these	   other	   factors	   affect	  foreign	  policy	   primarily	   by	   how	   they	   are	   filtered	   through	   the	   decision-­‐making	  authority—the	  coalition	  cabinet.	  	  When	  political	  parties	  disagree	  on	  responses	  to	  international	  norms,	  it	  is	  clear	   that	   these	   external	   pressures	   are	   not	   automatic	   determinants.	   Parties	  themselves	  may	  cite	  external	  normative	  pressure	  or	   internal	  cultural	  norms	  to	  support	  a	  policy,	  but	   the	  conflict	  between	  coalition	  partners	   itself	   still	  matters	  and	   is	  not	  predetermined.	   	  Even	   if	  normative	  pressures	  point	   to	   the	   likelihood	  that	   one	   side	   will	   prevail,	   the	   disagreement	   between	   parties	   may	   have	   other	  politically	  significant	  consequences	  (such	  as	  loss	  of	  prestige	  in	  the	  international	  community,	   side	   payments	   on	   other	   policies,	   new	   elections,	   or	   political	  instability).	  	  	  Coalition	  politics	  are	  often	  assumed	  to	  prevent	  foreign	  policy	  change,	  as	  the	   multiple	   veto-­‐players	   in	   coalitions	   may	   constrain	   and	   even	   deadlocked	  foreign	   policy	   (for	   review,	   see	   Author,	   2012).	   	   According	   to	   this	   perspective,	  countries	  governed	  by	  coalitions	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  change	  foreign	  policy,	  either	  to	  embrace	  new	  norms	  or	  reject	  previously	   internalized	  ones.	   	  A	  decision	  making	  approach,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  sees	  institutional	  constraints	  as	  non-­‐deterministic.	  	  Qualitative	  research	  suggests	  that	  outcomes	  of	  party	  disagreements	  in	  coalitions	  are	   conditioned	   by	   many	   factors,	   including	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   issue,	   decision-­‐making	  tactics,	  the	  leadership	  style,	  and	  the	  unity	  of	  the	  parties	  (Author,	  1996;	  Ozkececi-­‐Taner,	  2009;	  Oppermann	  and	  Brummer,	  2014).	  	  Quantitative	  research	  finds	   that	   coalitions	   are	   not	   as	   deadlocked	   as	   assumed	   and	   engage	   in	   more	  
	   4	  
extreme	  foreign	  policy	  than	  single	  party	  cabinets	  (Author,	  2008;	  Oktay,	  2014).	  I	  address	  this	  debate	  by	  examining	  how	  coalition	  cabinets	  change	  foreign	  policy	  in	  the	   face	   of	   external	   normative	   pull	   factors	   and	   despite	   significant	   internal	  divisions.	  	  	  	  
Coalition	   Cabinet	   Responses	   to	   International	   Norms:	   	   Two	   Comparative	  
Case	  Studies	  This	  article	  examines	  two	  cases	  of	  contestation	  in	  coalition	  cabinets	  over	  international	  norms	  –	  Japanese	  decision-­‐making	  over	  the	  ban	  of	  imported	  rice	  in	  response	   to	   international	   norms	   of	   trade	   liberalisation	   (1993)	   and	   Turkish	  decision-­‐making	  over	  the	  ban	  of	  the	  death	  penalty	   in	  response	  to	   international	  (particularly	  EU)	  norms	  on	  human	  rights	   (1999-­‐2002).	   	   In	  each	   case,	   coalition	  partners	  disagreed	  over	  the	  policy	  response	  to	  the	  norm.	   	   	  Each	  case	  examines	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  international	  norm	  became	  entangled	  in	  internal	  coalition	  politics.	   	   The	   Japanese	   and	   Turkish	   cases	   are	   instances	   of	   (eventual)	   policy	  change,	  over	  the	  objection	  of	  veto-­‐players.	  	  The	  explanations	  of	  the	  outcomes	  of	  these	   cases	   furthers	   our	   understanding	   of	   how	   the	   pull	   processes	   associated	  with	  international	  norms	  are	  responded	  to	  by	  states.	  	  	  These	   cases	   are	   not	   representative,	   in	   a	   statistical	   sense,	   of	   coalition	  disagreements	  over	   international	  norms.	   	  But	   they	  do	  provide	  a	   rich	  empirical	  platform	   for	   assessing	   how	   coalitions	   respond	   to	   norms	   across	   very	   different	  temporal,	  institutional,	  and	  political	  landscapes.	   	  This	  study	  has	  the	  advantages	  of	  the	  comparative	  case	  study	  method	  –	  an	  ability	  to	  trace	  the	  decision	  making	  processes	  and	  the	  microfoundations	  of	  social	  and	  political	  phenomena,	  develop	  theory,	  examine	  causal	  factors	  and	  underlying	  mechanisms	  in	  context,	  attend	  to	  complex	   causation	  and	  path-­‐dependent	  dynamics,	   and	   identify	  patterns	  across	  different	   contexts	   (George	   and	   Bennett,	   2004;	   Beach	   and	   Pedersen,	   2013).	  Evidence	   for	   the	   case	   studies	   comes	   from	   a	   variety	   of	   materials,	   including	  secondary	   sources,	   journalist	   accounts,	   and	   primary	   source	  material.	   	   In	   each	  case,	   I	  briefly	  examine	  the	   international	  norm	  in	  question,	  outline	  the	  coalition	  parties’	   positions	   on	   the	   country’s	   proper	   response	   to	   the	   norm,	   trace	   the	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decision-­‐making	  process	   through	   to	   the	  outcome	   (a	  policy	  decision),	   and	  offer	  explanations	  for	  why	  that	  particular	  outcome	  emerged.1	  	  	  	  These	  cases	  were	  not	  chosen	  to	  compare	  different	  explanations	  of	  foreign	  policy	   change,	   but	   rather	   to	   illustrate	   the	   complex	   decision-­‐making	   processes	  involved	  in	  the	  polities	  and	  politics	  associated	  with	  coalition	  cabinets.	  	  The	  cases	  are	   different	   in	   many	   respects,	   including	   the	   historical,	   cultural,	   and	   political	  contexts	   and	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   foreign	   policy	   issue.	   	   Yet	   both	   cases	   include	  coalitions	   comprised	   of	   ideologically	   diverse	   partners	   who	   disagree	   on	   their	  country’s	  proper	  response	  to	  international	  pressures,	  despite	  the	  strong	  ‘pull’	  of	  international	  norms	  in	  these	  cases.	  	  Both	  cases	  involve	  junior	  coalition	  partners	  who	  oppose	  foreign	  policy	  change	  and	  threaten	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  government	  over	   the	   policy	   disagreement.	   	   As	   such,	   these	   cases	   are	   good	   laboratories	   to	  investigate	  the	   interplay	  of	  domestic	  and	  international	   factors	   in	  foreign	  policy	  change.	  	  	  	  Japan,	  International	  Trade	  Liberalisation,	  and	  the	  Lift	  of	  the	  Rice	  Ban	  	   Japan’s	   (domestically	   popular)	   post-­‐WWII	   protectionist,	   mercantilist	  foreign	   economic	   policies	   clashed	   with	   (U.S.-­‐backed)	   international	   norms	   of	  liberalisation.	  	  Although	  Japan	  was	  a	  GATT	  member	  throughout	  this	  time	  and	  by	  the	  1970s	  had	  considerably	  reduced	  its	  formal	  trade	  tariffs,	   	  “Japan	  maintained	  numerous	   non-­‐tariff	   barriers,	   institutions,	   and	   other	   practices	   that	   protected	  national	   industries	   and	   contravened	   the	   fundamental	   objective	   of	   the	   GATT	  system:	  the	  liberalisation	  of	  trade”	  (Cortell	  and	  Davis,	  2005,	  p.4).	  	  By	  the	  1980s,	  the	  main	   area	   of	   Japanese	   trade	   that	   remained	   protected,	   at	   odds	  with	  GATT-­‐based	  norms,	  was	  agricultural	  products,	  particularly	  Japan’s	  ban	  on	  rice	  imports.	  Japan	   cited	   many	   reasons	   for	   its	   preference	   to	   not	   import	   rice,	   including	  Japanese	   laws	   identifying	   self-­‐sufficiency	   in	   rice	   as	   a	  national	   security	   interest	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The two cases in this paper, along with ten others, are developed fully in my book 
(Author, 2012).  The book focuses on explaining the outcomes of coalition 
disagreements and on the consequences of coalition politics for effective decision-
making, foreign policy and international relations.  It is not directly focused on the 
question of international norms and foreign policy change, as is this article. 
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(Blaker,	   1998).	   In	   addition,	   for	   Japan,	   rice	   is	   a	   near-­‐sacred	   product,	   deeply	  embedded	   in	   Japanese	   history,	   culture,	   economics,	   politics,	   and	   symbolism;	   it	  was	   the	   ultimate	   non-­‐negotiable	   market-­‐access	   topic.	   “Not	   a	   single	   grain	   of	  foreign	   rice	   shall	   ever	   enter	   Japan,”	  was	   the	   vow	  of	  most	   Japanese	   politicians,	  backed	  by	  public	  opinion,	  the	  press,	  the	  business	  community,	  academics,	  and	  the	  bureaucracy.	   Demands	   for	   opening	   the	   Japanese	   rice	   market	   were	   seen	   as	   a	  frontal	  assault	  on	  Japanese	  culture	  itself	  (Blaker,	  1998,	  p.215).	  As	   “rice	   became	   a	   symbol	   of	   all	   that	   was	   wrong	   with	   U.S.-­‐Japan	   trade	  relations,	   international	   attention	   increasingly	   focused	   on	   Japanese	  protectionism”	   (Schwartz,	   1998,	   p.260).	   In	   1986,	   the	   United	   States	   issued	   a	  formal	  complaint	  against	   Japan’s	  restrictions	  on	  agricultural	   imports,	   including	  rice.	  Japan	  responded	  by	  seeking	  exceptions	  to	  rice	  in	  multilateral	  liberalization	  negotiations.	   	   In	   the	   1990s,	   the	   United	   States,	   along	   with	   Canada	   and	   the	  European	  Community,	   proposed	   comprehensive	   negotiations	   to	   force	   Japan	   to	  confront	   the	   rice	   issue	   (Blaker,	   1998).	   In	   addition,	   the	  United	   States	   offered	   a	  compromise:	  Japan	  could	  delay	  implementing	  tariffs	  on	  rice	  for	  six	  years,	  during	  which	  time	  the	  United	  States	  would	  be	  granted	  minimum	  access	  to	  the	  Japanese	  rice	  market.	  Additional	  talks,	  some	  of	  them	  secret,	  ensued	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Japan’s	   Ministry	   of	   Agriculture	   to	   work	   out	   details.	   Under	   pressure,	   Japanese	  officials	   privately	   became	   resigned	   to	   some	   form	   of	   liberalization	   (Schwartz,	  1998).	   	   Thus,	   in	   the	   early	   1990s,	   Japan	   faced	   considerable	   pull	   factors:	   a	  structured	   international	   norm	   environment	   (trade	   liberalization),	   political	  institutions	   (GATT	   backed	   by	   the	   weight	   of	   U.S.	   power),	   and	   international	  politics	  (GATT	  negotiations	  and	  U.S.	  and	  other	  state	  lobbying).	  These	  developments	  occurred	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1993	  simultaneous	  with	  domestic	  political	  upheaval	  in	  Japan	  in	  which	  the	  long-­‐ruling	  Liberal	  Democrats	  were	   replaced	   by	   a	   coalition	   government,	   under	   Minister	   (PM)	   Hosokawa.	  Taking	   office	   during	   the	   final	   round	   of	   GATT	   negotiations,	   Hosokawa’s	  government	  faced	  significant	  international	  pressure	  to	  import	  rice	  and	  domestic	  pressures	  to	  retain	  the	  ban.	   	  A	  parliamentary	  resolution	  on	  rice	  self-­‐sufficiency	  remained	   in	   effect	   and	   long-­‐standing	   domestic	   opposition	   to	   rice	   imports	  remained	   strong.	   The	   chief	   barrier	   to	   change	   was	   disagreement	   within	   his	  governing	   coalition	   (the	   key	   domestic	   polity	   in	   this	   case).	   	   Hosakawa’s	   public	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popularity	   and	   his	   mandate	   for	   political	   reform	   “did	   not	   translate	   into	   the	  political	  clout	  to	  force	  opponents	  in	  his	  multi-­‐party	  government,	  especially	  on	  a	  subject	   as	   touchy	   as	   rice.	   The	   coalition	   was	   not	   united	   on	   rice	   liberalization”	  (Blaker,	  1998,	  p.226).	  Hosokawa’s	  Japan	  New	  Party	  was	  the	  key	  player	  in	  Japan’s	  first	  coalition.	  	  Hosokawa	  assembled	  a	  seven-­‐party	  coalition,	  with	  the	  Socialists	  controlling	  six	  cabinet	   posts	   and	   the	   Japan	   Renewal	   Party	   (JRP)	   five.	   	   Takemura,	   head	   of	  Sakigake	   (New	   Party	   Harbinger)	   was	   also	   a	   key	   actor	   in	   the	   coalition,	   even	  though	  it	  was	  a	  very	  small	  party	  (Curtis,	  1999).	  	  The	  coalition	  was	  generally	  very	  ideologically	  diverse	   (Curtis,	   1999;	  Hideo,	   2000)	   and	  particularly	  divided	  over	  the	   issue	   of	   rice	   imports.	   Both	   Hosokawa	   and	   Ozawa	   represented	   domestic	  agents	  (push	  factors)	  as	  they	  favored	  opening	  the	  rice	  market	  before	  they	  took	  office	   (Financial	   Times	   (FT),	   1993a).	   Japan	   New	   Party’s	   platform	   included	  neoliberal	   commitments	   of	   deregulation	   and	   trade	   liberalization.	   “Particularly	  significant	  was	  the	  fact	  that	  during	  the	  1993	  election	  campaign	  Hosokawa	  called	  for	   the	   opening	   of	   the	   Japanese	   rice	   market,	   hitherto	   regarded	   as	   a	   taboo	   by	  political	   parties”	   (Hideo,	   2000,	   p.142).	   “Prime	   Minister	   Hosokawa	   personally	  placed	  the	  highest	  priority	  on	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  GATT	  Uruguay	  Round.	  In	  his	  words:	  ‘Japan	  is	  in	  the	  world	  system	  and	  I	  thought	  that	  we	  must	  show	  leadership	  by	   contributing	   to	   the	   successful	   conclusion	   of	   the	  Uruguay	  Round’”	   (Shinoda,	  1998,	  p.705).	  	  	  Although	   Hosokawa	   himself	   favored	   liberalization,	   as	   PM	   he	   reiterated	  the	   official	   line	   of	   opposing	   the	   lifting	   of	   the	   ban	   (Straits	   Times,	   1993)	   and	  repeated	   that	   Japan	  would	  respect	  parliament’s	   resolution	  and	  not	   import	   rice	  (Agence	  France	  Presse	  (AFP),	  1993a).	  When	  a	  report	  surfaced	  in	  October	  1993	  that	  Japan	  and	  the	  United	  States	  were	  negotiating	  a	  tariff	  deal,	  Hosokawa	  denied	  it	  (Jiji	  Press	  Ticker	  Service,	  1993).	  After	  a	  visit	  from	  a	  GATT	  director-­‐general	  in	  October,	  “the	  prime	  minister’s	  defensive	  and	  evasive	  public	  statements	  stemmed	  from	  the	  tightrope	  he	  was	  walking	  in	  domestic	  politics.	  Caught	  between	  his	  own	  preferences	   and	   stated	   commitments	   and	   his	   die-­‐hard	   political	   opponents,	  Hosokawa	  was	  frustrated	  and	  cautious”	  (Blaker,	  1998,	  p.228).	  Hosokawa	  had	  support	  from	  his	  own	  party,	  Komeito,	  and	  the	  Democratic	  Socialist	   Party	   (Shinoda,	   1998).	   To	   persuade	   Sakigake	   to	   join	   the	   coalition,	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however,	  Hosokawa	  had	  pledged	  that	  he	  would	  oppose	  subjecting	  rice	  to	  tariffs	  (but	  did	  not	  rule	  out	  a	  compromise)	  (Blaker,	  1998).	  Some	  hardline	  opposition	  to	  tariffs	  arose	   in	  Ozawa’s	  Renewal	  Party,	   “but	  Ozawa	  seemed	  able	   to	  contain	  his	  troops	   and	   kept	   them	   in	   the	   party	   and	   the	   coalition”	   (Blaker,	   1998,	   p.227).	  Ozawa	   also	   supported	   tariffs,	   warning	   that	   Japan	   would	   be	   isolated	   in	   the	  international	   arena	   if	   the	   United	   States	   and	   Europe	   reached	   an	   agreement	   on	  agricultural	  issues	  (Japan	  Economic	  Newswire,	  1993).	  The	   Socialists	   were	   the	   coalition’s	  main	   source	   of	   opposition	   to	   tariffs.	  When	   rumours	   surfaced	   that	   Japan	   and	   the	   United	   States	   were	   negotiating	   a	  tariff	   deal,	   the	   Socialists	   warned	   “that	   Hosokawa	   risks	   undermining	   the	  governing	  coalition	  if	  he	  unilaterally	  endorses	  a	  lifting	  of	  the	  ban	  [and	  that]	  any	  move	  to	  lift	  the	  rice	  ban	  would	  run	  counter	  to	  an	  agreement	  among	  the	  coalition	  members	   to	   oppose	   liberalization”	   (United	   Press	   International	   (UPI),	   1993a).	  The	  Socialists	  opposed	  any	  compromise	  and	  reportedly	  warned	  Hosokawa	  that	  “there	   could	   be	   opinions	   emerging	   in	   our	   party	   to	   leave	   the	   coalition”	   (AFP,	  1993b).	  	  	  The	  Socialists	  were	  supported	  by	  interest	  groups,	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  public,	  and	  the	  main	  opposition	  party,	  the	  LDP.	  In	  the	  fall	  of	  1993,	  the	  Japanese	  public	  was	  divided	  over	  opening	  their	  rice	  market	  to,	  with	  42	  percent	  favoring	  and	  44	  percent	  opposing	   the	   idea.	   	  Many	   in	   the	  public,	  however,	   felt	   that	   Japan	  would	  have	  to	  accept	  rice	   imports	  eventually	  (Asahi	  News	  Service,	  1993a;	  Cortell	  and	  Davis,	   2005).	   	   Rice	   farmers	   were	   a	   vocal	   and	   visible	   source	   of	   opposition,	  protesting	   in	   the	   streets	   of	   Tokyo,	   even	   though	   surveys	   showed	   that	   most	  farmers	   also	   believed	   that	   rice	   imports	   were	   unavoidable	   in	   the	   future	   (FT,	  1993a).	  Supporters	   of	   liberalization	   attempted	   to	   change	   domestic	   opposition.	  Hosokawa	   sent	   the	   Agriculture	  Minister	   on	   a	   surprise	   trip	   to	   Europe	   to	   again	  request	   for	   an	   exemption	   for	   Japanese	   rice,	   in	   order	   to	   demonstrate	   to	   the	  Japanese	   that	   his	   government	   had	   tried	   to	   fight	   rice	   imports	   (Straits	   Times,	  1993).	  	  The	  government	  also	  stressed	  “the	  danger	  of	  Japan	  being	  blamed	  for	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  talks	  if	  it	  does	  not	  agree	  to	  a	  compromise	  deal	  on	  rice”	  (FT,	  1993b).	  	   Throughout	  November	  1993,	  government	  leaders	  continued	  to	  deny	  secret	  negotiations	  on	  rice	  liberalization.	  	  Not	  until	  late	  November	  did	  a	  senior	  official	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reveal	   that	   Japan	   indeed	  was	  negotiating	  with	   the	  United	  States	   regarding	  rice	  tariffs	  and	  was	  likely	  to	  accept	  a	  compromise	  that	  phased	  in	  tariffs	  over	  six	  years	  (Emiko,	   1993).	   The	   compromise—known	   as	   “minimum	  access”—was	   officially	  presented	  to	  the	  cabinet	   in	  early	  December	  1993.	  Hosokawa	  argued	  that	  Japan	  had	  an	  obligation	  to	  uphold	  the	  world’s	  free	  trade	  system	  (Asahi	  News	  Service,	  1993b).	  	  	  Disagreement	  in	  the	  coalition	  and	  ambiguity	  about	  the	  compromise	  led	  Hosokawa	   to	   postpone	   a	   cabinet	  meeting	   to	   decide	   the	   issue.	   Amid	   the	   delay,	  GATT	   officials	   pressured	   Japan	   to	   reach	   a	   decision	   and	   rice	   farmers	   were	  arrested	  for	  protesting	  at	  the	  parliament	  building.	  	  	   In	   early	   December,	   Hosokawa	   called	   an	   emergency	   meeting	   with	   the	  Socialists	   and	   sent	   Foreign	  Minister	  Hata	   to	   Geneva	   to	   try	   to	   gain	   last-­‐minute	  concessions	   (Talmadge,	   1993).	   Hata	   returned	   with	   no	   alternatives,	   and	   the	  cabinet	   scheduled	   an	   extraordinary	   meeting	   to	   accept	   the	   minimum-­‐access	  proposal,	  even	  if	   the	  Socialists	  would	  not	  approve	  (UPI,	  1993b).	   	  The	  Socialists	  remained	  divided	  on	  the	  policy	  and	  on	  whether	  to	  leave	  the	  coalition	  (Kin,	  1993;	  Blaker,	  1998).	  “With	  Hosokawa	  only	  holding	  a	  slim	  parliamentary	  majority…the	  departure	   of	   just	   a	   few	   SDP	   members	   would	   threaten	   the	   four-­‐month-­‐old	  government”	   (UPI,	   1993b).	   	   Finally,	   the	   Socialists	   changed	   their	   position	   in	   an	  overnight	  meeting,	  whilst	   famers	   held	   an	   all-­‐night	   protest	   outside.	   	   The	   party	  decided	   reluctantly	   to	   accept	   the	   proposal	   and	   to	   remain	   in	   the	   government	  (AFP,	  1993c).	   	  Shortly	  thereafter,	  the	  cabinet	  met	  at	  3:16	  A.M.	  on	  December	  14	  to	   approve	   the	   “minimal	   access.”	   “‘We	  must	   do	   it	   for	   the	   sake	   of	  world	   trade,’	  Hosokawa	   said	   at	   a	   4	   A.M.	   news	   conference	   where	   he	   asked	   for	   the	   nation’s	  understanding”	  (Talmadge,	  1993).	  The	   Socialists’	   attempt	   to	   constrain	   the	   coalition	   from	   changing	   its	  foreign	  policy	  and	  adapting	  to	   international	  normative	  pressures	  failed	  despite	  the	  party’s	  blackmail	  potential.	  Two	  factors	  were	  particularly	   important	   in	  this	  case’s	   outcome.	   	   First,	  Hosakawa’s	   personal	   commitment	   to	   rice	   liberalization,	  his	   leadership	   style,	   and	   the	   decision-­‐making	   processes	   he	   established	   in	   the	  coalition	  allowed	  him	  to	  prevail	  over	  the	  Socialists’	  objections	  (Shinoda,	  1998).	  According	  to	  Shinoda	  (1998,	  pp.706-­‐7),	   the	  “centralized	  nature	  of	   the	  coalition	  government	  helped	   in	   implementing	  Hosokawa’s	  political	  decision	   to	  open	   the	  rice	  market.”	  The	  PM	  never	  met	  with	  officials	  from	  the	  agricultural	  ministry	  and	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for	  months	  denied	  that	  negotiations	  were	  taking	  place	  (Blaker,	  1998).	  Hosakowa	  also	   tried	   to	   keep	   the	   issue	   out	   of	   public	   scrutiny.	   	   Government	   officials	  repeatedly	  denied	   reports	   of	   the	   compromise	   and	   insisted	   that	   Japan	  was	   still	  trying	   to	   negotiate	   a	   better	   deal.	   	   	   “As	   late	   as	  December	   9…Hosokawa	  himself	  publicly	   rejected	   reports	   of	   a	   final	   agreement.	   The	   Japanese	   leaders’	   claim	  strained	  credulity”	  (Blaker,	  1998,	  p.230).	   	  	   The	  way	  the	  Socialists	  attempted	  to	  constrain	  this	  policy	  and	  their	  political	  calculations	   were	   also	   important.	   The	   party	   adopted	   a	   rigid	   negotiating	   style	  throughout:	   “The	   Socialists,	   known	   for	   nearly	   four	   decades	   as	   a	   party	   in	  perpetual	   opposition,	   were	   still	   playing	   that	   adversarial	   role—to	   the	   point	   of	  posing	   hostile	   queries	   about	   the	   state	   of	   the	   rice	   liberalization	   negotiations	  directly	   to	   the	   prime	   minister	   on	   the	   Diet	   floor.	   In	   the	   end,	   the	   negativistic	  politics	  of	  the	  Socialists	  left	  them	  out	  of	  the	  loop”	  (Blaker,	  1998,	  p.230).	  Although	  they	  threatened	  to	  leave	  the	  coalition	  over	  the	  rice	  issue,	  “in	  the	  end,	  the	  party	  decided	   that	  breaking	  with	   the	  popular	  prime	  minister	   and	  bearing	   the	  blame	  for	   the	   collapse	   of	   the	   world	   trade	   system	   would	   be	   much	   more	   dangerous	  politically	  than	  protecting	  rice	  farmers”	  (Shinoda,	  1998,	  pp.706-­‐7).	  	   In	   this	   case,	   no	   politician	   seemed	  willing	   to	   confront	   the	   pressure	   of	   the	  international	  community	  and	  risk	  isolating	  Japan	  (Blaker,	  1998,	  p.230).	  Yet	  the	  PM	   navigated	   both	   internal	   and	   external	   pressures	   to	   significantly	   change	  Japan’s	  foreign	  policy.	  According	  to	  Nonaka,	  Hosokawa	  “neither	  obeyed	  the	  U.S.	  government,	   nor	   utilized	   gaiatsu,	   as	   external	   or	   U.S.	   government	   pressure	   for	  domestic	  reform”	  (Naoto	  2000,	  p.108)	  This	  decision	  is	  viewed	  as	  a	  major	  policy	  achievement	   and	   the	   Hosokawa	   government	   is	   characterized	   as	   “successfully”	  pursuing	   rice	   market	   liberalization,	   one	   of	   its	   chief	   goals,	   although	   with	  considerable	  delay	  and	  even	  deception	  (Curtis,	  1999,	  p.134).	  	   Despite	   the	  announcement	  of	   the	  agreement	   to	  allow	  minimal	  access,	   the	  issue	   of	   rice	   liberalization	   continued	   to	   cause	   problems	   for	   the	   coalition.	   The	  Socialists	   maintained	   pressure	   on	   Hosokawa	   not	   to	   sign	   the	   Uruguay	   Round	  treaty	  and	  again,	  threatened	  to	  resign.	  	  “Hosokawa	  said,	  he	  told	  them	  to	  go	  ahead	  and	  resign	   if	   that	   is	  what	   they	  wanted	   to	  do.	  He	  said	   that	  he	  was	  proud	  of	  his	  decision	   to	   open	   the	   rice	   market	   and	   that	   it	   was	   all	   right	   with	   him	   if	   his	  government	   fell	   on	   this	   issue”	   (Hosokawa	   interview,	   quoted	   in	   Curtis,	   1999,	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p.264).	  	  Hosokawa	  claimed	  that	  he	  resigned	  as	  PM	  to	  reduce	  the	  Socialist	  Party’s	  ability	   to	   obstruct	   Japanese	   policy	   (Curtis,	   1999).	   The	   rice	   liberalization	   issue	  weakened	   the	   Socialists’	   internal	   cohesion,	   and	   they	  were	   left	   out	   of	   the	   next	  coalition	  (Mochizuki,	  1995).	  	  Turkey,	   International	   Norms	   of	   Human	  Rights,	   and	   the	   Abolition	   of	   the	   Death	  Penalty	  In	  March	  2001,	   the	  EU	   (the	  chief	   agent	  at	   the	   international	   level	   in	   this	  case)	   agreed	   on	   the	   Accession	   Partnership	   for	   Turkey.	   This	   framework	  established	  the	  economic,	  legal,	  and	  political	  reforms	  (the	  Copenhagen	  criteria)	  necessary	   for	   membership.	   	   These	   criteria	   enshrined	   European	   and	  international	   norms	   about	  democracy,	   liberalism,	   and	  human	   rights	   (Manners,	  2002)	  and	  represent	  the	  external	  normative	  environment	  in	  this	  case.	  Although	  all	   of	   Turkey’s	   political	   parties	   generally	   supported	   EU	   membership,	   some	  reforms	   were	   contentious,	   particularly	   the	   abolishment	   of	   the	   death	   penalty	  which	   was	   required	   by	   the	   Accession	   Partnership	   (Robins,	   2003).	   	   Turkish	  public	   opinion	   was	   not	   very	   supportive	   of	   complete	   abolition	   of	   the	   death	  penalty	   (Associated	   Press,	   1998).	   According	   to	   Mehmet	   Güner,	   director	   of	   an	  organization	  for	  families	  of	  soldiers	  and	  police	  killed	  in	  the	  line	  of	  duty,	  “We	  do	  not	   accept	   any	   good	   will	   for	   those	   who	   want	   to	   divide	   this	   country	   and	   pull	  down	  our	  flag….Ending	  capital	  punishment	  should	  not	  be	  a	  precondition	  to	  enter	  the	   European	   Union.	   If	   they	   like	   us,	   they	   better	   accept	   us,	   the	   way	   we	   are”	  (Frantz,	  2001).	  The	   issue	   of	   the	   death	   penalty	   was	   connected	   to	   Turkey’s	   convicted	  terrorists	   and	   the	   Kurdish	   nationalist	   problem.	   Members	   of	   the	   Kurdistan	  Worker’s	  Party	  (PKK),	  the	  political	  and	  terrorist	  organization	  in	  Turkey	  seeking	  Kurdish	  independence,	  were	  found	  guilty	  of	   terrorism	  and	  had	  been	  sentenced	  to	  death.	  Most	   important,	   the	  PKK’s	   leader,	  Abdullah	  Öcalan	  was	   sentenced	   to	  death	   and	   was	   awaiting	   this	   punishment	   when	   the	   EU	   issued	   its	   demands	   to	  Turkey	   regarding	   the	   death	   penalty.	   The	   execution	   of	   Öcalan	   became	   a	   very	  sensitive	  issue	  within	  Turkey,	  and	  in	  Turkish	  foreign	  policy	  (Dunér	  and	  Deverell,	  2001;	  Eralp,	  2003).	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The	  EU’s	  requirement	  that	  the	  law	  be	  abolished	  became	  one	  of	  the	  focal	  points	   in	   European-­‐Turkish	   relations	   and	   the	   politics	   of	   its	   international	  negotations.	  At	  the	  1999	  Helsinki	  Summit,	  EU	  President	  Solana	  summarized	  the	  EU’s	   position:	   “It	   would	   be	   very	   difficult	   to	   have	   a	   member	   in	   the	   European	  family	  who	  does	  not	  have	  the	  same	  respect	   for	   life”	  (Associated	  Press,	  1999b).	  The	   death	   penalty	   also	   became	   a	   foreign	   policy	   issue	   in	   Turkey’s	   bilateral	  relations	  (additional	  pull	  factors	  at	  the	  external	  level),	  particularly	  with	  Italy	  and	  Belgium	   who	   refused	   to	   extradite	   PKK	   leaders	   to	   Turkey	   because	   they	   faced	  capital	   punishment	   (Dogar	   and	   Dennis,	   1998).	   More	   generally,	   Turkey	   found	  itself	   out	   of	   step	   with	   liberal	   international	   norms	   of	   human	   rights	   and	   the	  growing	   notion	   that	   domestic	   political	   conditions	   are	   relevant	   to	   foreign	  relations.	   According	   to	   Robins,	   “Turkey	   just	   did	   not	   connect	  with	   the	   spirit	   of	  these	  normative	  changes”	  (Robins,	  2003,	  p.30).	  This	  lack	  of	  connection,	  Rumford	  argues,	   and	   the	   inconsistency	   	   “in	   Turkey’s	   approach	   to	   aligning	   domestic	  democratic	   norms	   with	   those	   of	   the	   EU	   is	   the	   result	   of	   divisions	   within	   the	  political	  elites”	  (Rumford,	  2002,	  p.51).	  Indeed,	   the	  cabinet	   that	  came	   to	  power	   in	  1999—the	  coalition	  between	  the	   Democratic	   Left	   Party,	   the	   Nationalist	   Action	   Party,	   and	   the	   Motherland	  Party—attempted	   to	  commute	  existing	  death	  sentences	   to	   life	   in	   jail	  but	   failed	  because	  of	  disagreements	  among	  coalition	  member,	  despite	  European	  pressures	  to	   act.	   	   In	   October	   2001,	   Parliament	   passed	   thirty-­‐four	   amendments	   to	   the	  constitution	   to	   conform	   to	   EU	   requirements,	   and	   the	   death	   penalty	   was	  restricted	   to	   crimes	   committed	   in	   cases	   of	  war	   or	   the	   imminent	   threat	   of	  war	  and	   terror	   crimes.	   	   The	   EU	   was	   not	   satisfied	   and	   insisted	   that	   Turkiey	   must	  abolish	  the	  death	  penalty	  completely	  (Hale,	  2002).	  Although	  parliament	  held	  the	  final	  authority	  to	  the	  death	  penalty	  law	  lay,	  the	  cabinet	  (the	  primary	  domestic	  agent	  in	  this	  case)	  was	  critical	  to	  the	  decision	  (Mclaren	  and	  Müftüler-­‐Bac,	  2003).2	  The	  conflict	  between	  the	  coalition	  partners	  (the	   primary	   domestic	   agents	   in	   this	   case)	   over	   the	   death	   penalty,	   however,	  remained	   unresolved	   through	   the	   government’s	   tenure	   and	   weakened	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 There is no evidence of direct presidential or military pressure or involvement in 
this case (Avci, 2003). 
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government	  (Hale,	  2003).	  “The	  widening	  of	  human	  rights	  thus	  became	  Turkey’s	  most	  pressing	  political	  question	  alongside	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  government”	  (Hale,	  2003,	  p.107).	   	  The	  Democratic	  Left	  party,	   the	   largest	  party	   in	   the	  coalition	  and	  the	   party	   of	   PM	   Ecevit,	   and	   the	   Motherland	   Party	   (as	   domestic	   push	   factors)	  supported	  abolishing	  the	  death	  penalty;	  the	  Nationalist	  Party,	  the	  second	  largest	  party	  in	  the	  cabinet,	  was	  staunchly	  opposed.	  Although	   the	   Democratic	   Left	   Party	   was	   nationalist	   and	   held	   deep	  suspicions	  of	  the	  EU,	  it	  saw	  the	  death	  penalty	  as	  problematic	  for	  Turkish	  foreign	  relations	  (Ozkececi-­‐Taner,	  2009;	  Dunér	  and	  Deverell,	  2001).	   	  Ecevit	  stated	  that	  “it	   is	   clear	   that	   the	   capital	   punishment	   cannot	   go	   with	   EU	   membership”	   and	  called	   the	   two	  a	   “contradiction.”	  He	   continued,	   “God	  willing,	  we	  will	   overcome	  this	  contradiction	  soon”	  (Associated	  Press,	  1999a).	  The	  minister	  of	   justice,	  also	  from	  the	  Democratic	  Left	  Party,	  agreed:	  ‘Turkey,	  as	  being	  a	  member	  of	  both	  the	  Council	   of	   Europe	   and	   a	   candidate	   country	   to	   the	  EU,	   has	   to	   review	   the	  death	  penalty”	  (Anadolu	  Agency,	  1999).	  	  While	  PM	  Ecevit	  expressed	  hope	   that	   the	  penalty	  could	  be	   lifted	   for	   the	  sake	   of	   EU	  membership;	   he	   also	   stressed	   that	   this	   would	   depend	   on	   support	  from	  the	  other	  members	  of	  his	  coalition	  government	  (AFP,	  1999).	  	  Ecevit	  could	  count	   on	   support	   from	   the	   Motherland	   Party,	   the	   smallest	   of	   the	   coalition	  partners,	   which	   was	   more	   internationalist	   in	   orientation	   and	   supported	  Turkey’s	   alignment	   with	   international	   human	   rights	   norms	   (Ozkececi-­‐Taner,	  2009).	   	  According	  to	  Önis	  (2003,	  p.18),	  no	  party	  “actively	  promoted	  EU-­‐related	  reforms	  as	  vocally”	  as	  the	  Motherland	  Party	  during	  this	  period.	  This	   was	   not	   the	   case	   with	   the	   other	   coalition	   partner,	   the	   Nationalist	  Action	   Party	   “which	   regarded	   any	   constitutional	   liberalization—especially	   on	  the	  Kurdish	  issue—as	  an	  insult	  to	  those	  who	  had	  died	  during	  the	  long	  struggle”	  against	   the	  PKK	  (Hale,	  2003,	  p.109).	  The	  Nationalist	  Action	  Party’s	  position	  on	  the	  death	  penalty	  directly	  stemmed	  from	  the	  party’s	  anti-­‐Kurd	  orientation.	  The	  party	  wanted	  to	  retain	  the	  death	  penalty	  and	  the	  right	  to	  execute	  Öcalan	  (Hale,	  2002;	  Ozkececi-­‐Taner,	  2009).	   	  The	  party’s	   leader	  “Bahçeli	  stated	  Turkey	  wants	  to	  unite	  with	  Europe	  in	  an	  honorable,	  fair	  and	  full	  membership.	  However,	  there	  would	   be	   ‘no	   bargaining	   concerning	   Öcalan’”	   (Avci,	   2003,	   p.160).	   During	   the	  1999	  elections,	  the	  Nationalist	  Action	  Party	  had	  campaigned	  on	  a	  “hang	  Öcalan”	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ticket	   (Dunér	  and	  Deverell,	  2001,	  p.3).	   “Officially,	   the	  MHP	  supported	  Turkey’s	  application	   for	  eventual	  accession,	  but	  party	  spokesman	  maintained	  that,	  since	  the	  EU	  was	  unlikely	  to	  admit	  Turkey	  anyway,	  there	  was	  no	  point	  in	  making	  these	  ‘concessions’”	  (Hale,	  2002,	  p.109).	  	  The	  Nationalist	  Action	  Party	  signaled	  that	  it	  would	  be	  willing	  to	  consider	  abolishing	   the	   death	   penalty	   but	   not	   the	   commutation	   of	   Öcalan’s	   sentence	  (Tinc,	  1999).	   In	  one	  deputy’s	  words:	   “First	  execution.	  Then	  we	  can	  abolish	   the	  death	   penalty”	   (quoted	   in	   Tinc,	   1999).	   Bahçeli	   too	   stood	   firm	   on	   Öcalan,	  stressing	   that	   “the	   sentence	  which	   the	  murderer	   deserved	   cannot	   be	   changed	  with	   pretexts”	   and	   that	   “efforts	   by	   some	   EU	   circles	   to	   present	   this	   (sparing	  Öcalan)	  as	  a	  basic	  condition	   for	  Turkey’s	  EU	  membership	  are	   the	   indication	  of	  double	  standards	  which	  contradict	  Europe’s	  own	  human	  rights	  and	  democracy	  values”	  (Associated	  Press,	  2002a).	   	  In	  the	  summer	  of	  2002,	  Bahçeli	  argued	  that	  there	   was	   no	   need	   to	   rush	   ahead	   with	   EU-­‐demanded	   reforms	   like	   the	   death	  penalty	   since	   Turkey	   would	   not	   be	   able	   to	   enter	   the	   EU	   for	   another	   decade	  anyway:	  “This	  murderer	  has	  become	  a	  condition	  for	  Turkey	  even	  to	  be	  given	  a	  date	   to	   start	   membership	   talks.	   If	   that	   is	   not	   injustice	   and	   disrespect	   to	   our	  country,	   then	   what	   is	   it?”	   He	   continued,	   “The	   nationalists	   will	   under	   no	  circumstances	  be	  part	  of	  such	  a	  move”	  (Associated	  Press,	  2002b).	  In	  2002,	  the	  party	  signaled	  that	  it	  was	  considering	  withdrawing	  from	  the	  coalition	   if	   the	   PM	   submitted	   a	   constitutional	   amendment	   to	   outlaw	   capital	  punishment	   (Sisler,	   2002).	   The	   support	   of	   the	  MHP	  was	  not	   necessary	   for	   the	  legislation	   to	   succeed,	   as	   the	  opposition	  parties	  generally	  backed	   the	  measure.	  “Ecevit…had	  either	  to	  persuade	  Bahçeli	  and	  his	  colleagues	  to	  change	  their	  minds,	  by	  citing	  the	  need	  to	  meet	  the	  Copenhagen	  criteria	  if	  Turkey	  were	  serious	  in	  its	  aim	  of	  gaining	  accession	  to	  the	  EU,	  or	  to	  appeal	  to	  support	  from	  the	  opposition	  parties,	   at	   the	   risk	  of	  provoking	  serious	  splits	   in	   the	  government”	   (Hale,	  2002,	  p.350).	  	  For	  a	  year	  and	  a	  half,	  the	  PM	  opted	  for	  delaying	  Turkey’s	  response	  to	  the	  EU	  in	  the	  hopes	  that	  he	  could	  keep	  the	  coalition	  together	  (Hale,	  2002).	  Eventually,	   in	   August	   2002,	   the	   Motherland	   Party,	   over	   Nationalists’	  objections,	   introduced	   a	   package	   of	   reforms	   in	   parliament	   that	   included	   the	  complete	  abolition	  of	  the	  death	  penalty.	  With	  support	  from	  the	  Democratic	  Left	  Party,	   Motherland,	   and	   the	   opposition	   parties,	   the	   legislation	   passed.	   The	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Nationalist	  Action	  Party	  voted	  as	  a	  bloc	  against	  the	  reforms,	  and	  the	  coalition	  fell	  shortly	   after	   this	   case	   as	   a	   result	   of	   partisan	   differences	   regarding	   EU-­‐related	  reforms	  (Özcan,	  2008).	  The	  coalition’s	  weakened	  nature	  by	  2002	  may	  have	  played	  a	  role	   in	   the	  eventual	  decision	  to	  proceed	  with	  the	  abolition	  of	  the	  death	  penalty.	  	  As	  general	  elections	   were	   approaching	   and	   the	   government	   was	   still	   dealing	   with	   the	  economic	  consequences	  of	   the	  2001	  financial	  crisis,	  PM	  Ecevit	  may	  have	  opted	  to	   risk	   the	   coalition	   and	   pass	   reforms	   that	   were	   necessary	   for	   membership.	  Although	   abolishing	   the	   death	   penalty	   was	   not	   popular	   in	   Turkey,	   the	  Democratic	  Left	  Party	  and	  the	  Motherland	  Party	  may	  have	  calculated	  that	  their	  constituencies	   would	   see	   the	   pro-­‐EU	   policy	   favorably.	   Also,	   as	   the	   election	  neared,	   the	   Nationalist	   Action	   Party’s	   threat	   to	   withdraw	   from	   the	   coalition	  became	  less	  meaningful—the	  coalition	  was	  not	  likely	  to	  survive	  the	  next	  election	  anyway.	  One	  possible	  reason	  the	  coalition	  survived	  its	  disagreements	  on	  this	  issue	  for	  so	  long	  was	  because	  of	  a	  commitment	  to	  the	  coalition.	  	  According	  to	  Başkan	  (2005,	  p.65)	  “Ecevit	  and	  Bahçeli	  acted	  like	  a	  state	  elite	  in	  emphasizing	  that	  the	  country’s	  interests	  were	  more	  important	  than	  each	  party’s	  interests.”	  PM	  Ecevit	  refused	   to	   dismantle	   the	   coalition	   to	   move	   forward	   on	   the	   reforms,	   and	   his	  “strong	   words	   to	   the	   PKK	   appear	   to	   be	   an	   attempt	   to	   placate	   MHP	   and	   its	  grassroots	  supporters”	  (Radio	  Free	  Europe,	  2000).	  Early	  on,	  Bahçeli	  apparently	  overruled	  the	  rest	  of	  his	  party	  by	  agreeing	  to	  postpone	  a	  final	  decision	  on	  Öcalan	  (Radio	  Free	  Europe,	  2000).	  The	  Nationalist	  Action	  Party,	  however,	  became	  more	  vocal	   and	   insistent	   in	   2002.	   With	   elections	   approaching	   and	   the	   party	   facing	  grassroots	   pressure,	   it	   may	   have	   felt	   the	   need	   to	   distinguish	   itself	   from	   its	  coalition	  partners	  (Avci,	  2003).	  The	  nature	  of	  this	  issue	  may	  have	  also	  played	  a	  role	  in	  this	  case.	  Although	  a	   compromise	   was	   attempted,	   with	   the	   2000	   legislation	   abolishing	   the	   death	  penalty	  except	  for	  terror	  crimes,	  the	  EU	  rejected	  it.	  The	  black-­‐and-­‐white	  choice	  facing	  Turkey	  prevented	  compromise	  between	  the	  parties	  (Hale,	  2003).	  Finally,	  the	   fact	   that	   Parliament	  would	  be	   the	   final	   locus	   of	   authority	   for	   this	   decision	  and	   that	   the	   opposition	   parties	   supported	   the	   abolition	   of	   the	   death	   penalty	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allowed	   the	   coalition	   to	   escape	   a	   direct	   decision	   that	   risked	   the	   government’s	  survival.	  This	   case	   of	   change	   in	   foreign	   policy	   to	   adapt	   to	   external	   normative	  pressure	  conforms	  with	  two	  somewhat	  contradictory	  images	  of	  coalition	  policy-­‐making.	  On	   the	  one	  hand,	   considerable	  deadlock	  and	  delay	  occurred.	  After	   the	  Helsinki	  Summit	   in	  December	  1999,	  Turkey	  knew	  it	  would	  have	   to	  abolish	   the	  death	   penalty	   so	   that	  membership	   negotiations	   could	   begin.	   But	   it	   did	   not	   act	  decisively	  for	  more	  than	  a	  year	  and	  a	  half.	  This	  delay	  stemmed	  directly	  from	  the	  opposition	  of	  a	  junior	  coalition	  partner.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  eventual	  decision	  was	   historic,	   and	   the	   time	   it	   took	   to	   pass	   the	   set	   of	   reforms	  was	   shorter	   than	  expected,	  given	  the	  significant	  opposition	  (Eralp,	  2004;	  Önis,	  2003).	  	  That	  such	  a	  weak	   coalition	  was	   able	   to	  make	   this	   reform	   runs	   contrary	   to	   the	   image	   that	  divided	  coalitions	  are	  incapable	  of	  producing	  anything	  but	  fragmented	  action.	  	  
Conclusions	  	   The	   cases	   in	   this	   article	   offer	   a	   window	   into	   the	   world	   where	  international	   normative	   pressures	   through	  polities	   and	  politics	  meet	   domestic	  political	   agents	   in	   domestic	   institutional	   contexts.	   	   The	   cases	   examine	   how	  coalition	   cabinets	   respond	   to	   international	   norms	   and	   when	   and	   how	   these	  responses	  lead	  to	  foreign	  policy	  change.	  	  They	  demonstrate	  that	  political	  parties	  can	  disagree	  on	  their	  state’s	  proper	  response	  –	  some	  support	  internalization	  of	  or	  at	  least	  compliance	  with	  international	  norms,	  others	  favor	  resisting	  external	  normative	  pressures.	  	  	  These	   cases	   also	   demonstrate	   that	   variation	   in	   countries’	   reactions	   is	  about	   more	   than	   a	   clash	   of	   external	   vs.	   internal	   norms.	   	   Internal	   agents	  themselves	  can	  disagree	  over	  both	   internal	  and	  external	  values	  and	  principles.	  	  States	  are	  not	  unitary	  normative	  agents	  and	  norms	  are	  filtered	  through	  domestic	  contestation,	  which	   is	  conditioned	  by	   institutions,	  actors’	  positions,	  and	  actors’	  decision	   making	   strategies.	   	   A	   decision	   making	   perspective	   highlights	   the	  complexities	  of	  contestation.	   	  Key	  factors	  explain	  the	  outcome	  of	  these	  internal	  conflicts,	   including	   PM	   leadership	   style,	   party	   strategies,	   political	   calculations	  and	  commitment	  to	  the	  coalition,	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  issue,	  and	  public	  support	  were	   all	   important	   in	   these	   cases.	   	   International	  pull	   factors	   –	  both	  normative	  
	   17	  
and	  material	  –	  was	  also	  present	  and	  may	  have	  tipped	  the	  balance	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  internal	  actors	  supporting	  the	  ‘zeitgeist’	  of	  the	  international	  norm,	  but	  external	  pressures	   in	   no	   way	   determined	   the	   final	   outcomes.	   	   Pressures	   failed	   to	  convince,	   and	   in	   some	   instances	   hardened	   the	   views	   of	   opponents	   to	   norm-­‐aligning	  foreign	  policy.	  	  Finally,	   these	   cases	   challenge	   the	   image	   of	   coalitions	   as	   incapable	   of	  significant	  foreign	  policy	  change.	  	  Despite	  the	  presence	  of	  multiple	  veto	  players	  with	   deep	   disagreements,	   the	   Japanese	   and	   Turkish	   cabinets	   made	   historic	  decisions.	  Yet	  in	  both	  cases,	  coalition	  politics	  considerably	  delayed	  the	  countries’	  responses	   to	   international	   norms	   due	   to	   the	   constraint	   of	   junior	   coalition	  partners.	   	   The	   junior	   coalition	   parties	   in	   these	   cases	   were	   not	   ‘hijacking’	   the	  policy	   (one	   strategy	   for	   junior	   party	   influence;	   see	   Author,	   1996,	   2012),	   but	  ‘blackmailing’	  the	  cabinet	  by	  using	  their	  required	  support	  for	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  coalition	  to	  prevent	  the	  PMs	  from	  doing	  what	  they	  would	  do.	  	  In	  these	  cases,	  PMs	  were	  able	  to	  eventually	  circumvent	  this	  opposition,	  for	  the	  multiple	  internal	  and	  external	  reasons	  discussed	  above.	  	  	  These	  cases	  demonstrate	  that	  attention	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  coalition	  politics	  is	  necessary	  for	  a	  complete	  understanding	  of	  their	  responses,	  and	  indeed	  for	  the	  responses	   of	   the	   many	   states	   ruled	   by	   coalitions,	   as	   they	   grapple	   with	  international	   norms	   and	   as	   international	   norms	   in	   turn	   become	   entangled	   in	  internal	  political	  decision	  making	  processes.	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